INTRODUCTION
As new technology continues to drive innovative applications, the mining industry must keep pace to remain competitive in an ever changing marketplace. The trend requires replacing outdated systems with high-performance, low-cost, option-rich devices that offer improved flexibility while reducing operating costs. Many functions of new control systems are being increasingly distributed to smart components capable of performing localized operations that were once the responsibility of a central or master controller. The integration of intelligent devices, device-Ievel networks, and interrogation software into motor control centers demonstrates improved diagnostics, permits early warnings for increased system reliability, offers design flexibility, and provides for simplified wiring and an enhanced level of personnel safety.
Energy consumption is an additional concern for mining operations. Being able to integrate energy consumption and the electrical distribution network into the process control system would provide the mine process engineer many advantages. This paper focuses on technology integration of intelligent devices via the IEC 61850 standard to traditional process control networks utilizing programmable automation controllers (P ACs).
ENERGY CONSUMPTION JUSTlFICATlON
In June 2007, the U. S. Department of Energy (USDOE) conducted a study on energy consumption in the mining industry.
This study sampled 20 of the largest energy intensive mineral extraction and processing facilities. The results of the study can be seen in Figs. 1 and 2. The difference of 667 Trillion Btu/year represents the possible energy savings, with proper monitoring equipment [1] . Additionally, the study further analyzed various components of mining and determined that grinding operations consumed far more energy than other processes, as shown in Fig. 2 . It can be seen that mining, oil, and gas extraction consume 32% of all industrial and commercial power usage in Canada [2] . Total manufacturing, which consists of many subsectors as shown on the right of Fig. 3 , conswnes 60% of all energy, but the largest individual energy consumer in the nation is the mining industry. Fig. 4 depicts the trend of energy usage. It can be seen that the mining industry has shown continuous growth from 1990-2008, while other industries have dec1ined. As previously stated, much of this energy is consumed in crushing and grinding processes [2] . The remainder of this paper describes an energy monitoring system that interfaces with command and control for the electrical distribution system of a taconite mining operation, by utilizing IEC 61850. 
III. TACONTTE MTNTNG-PROCESS OVERVTEW
Taconite is an iron-bearing rock that is essential to the steel-making industry. Iron ore mining and beneficiation are very energy intensive processes that require heavy crushing and grinding procedures.
To put this energy usage in perspective, in 2005, a Minnesota iron ore mine used an average of 275 MW of power, and is currently Minnesota's largest consumer of energy [3] . The process begins with hauling taconite from an open pit mine to the central processing facility. At the processing facility, raw taconite is delivered to the coarse ore crusher [4] . This machine, which typically operates at 13.8 kV, reduces the mined rock into conveyor size material. The coarse crusher is typically a 7850 hp synchronous machine with high-torque, low-speed characteristics.
The output material of the coarse crusher is then conveyed to the fine ore crusher. The belt conveyors are typically powered by dual 4160 V, 5000 hp induction motors, that continually operate during production shifts [4] . These conveyors feed the fine crusher house, which contains multiple mills that are also driven by 4.16 kV induction machines. The mills further reduce the coarsely crushed material to 3 cm. The [me material is then conveyed from the [me crusher house to the concentrator building, which houses rod and ball mills for grinding. These mills are driven by 4.16 kV, 2600 hp synchronous machines [4] . The output of these mills is a fine slurry mixture that is next sent to magnetic separators.
The magnetic separators remove ferrous material from non-ferrous material. The non-ferrous slurry material is pumped to the tailings pond, and the ferrous material is pumped in slurry form to the agglomeration building [4] . This building contains vacuum discs and balling drums to create taconite pellets. The pellets are then sent to a rotating kiln for drying and then to storage for shipment. These processes are performed with low voltage equipment.
A typical one-Iine diagram of a processing facility is shown in Fig. 5 . These taconite processing facilities are fed with 138 kV feeders from the utility. From this point, every facility has two feeds of 13.8 kV in a main-tie-main configuration, each with its own transformer. The 13.8 kV distribution voltage is then stepped down to 4.16 kV at each building to feed individual loads. The 4.16 kV busses are also configurable in a secondary-selective, main-tie-main scheme that can be implemented in case of bus failure. This configuration is often preferred in large mining operations because it allows critical loads to be transferred to healthy busses during times of an electrical system fault or insufficient spinning reserve. Many relays are utilized for operating and protecting these facilities including: instantaneous and time delay overcurrent (50/51 elements), differential (87 element), under-voltage (27 element), and others. Electrical protection has evolved over the past three decades from electromechanical to microprocessor based relays. Protection systems previously consisted of isolated, hard-wired interlocked electro-mechanical and solid state relays that had limited system visibility. These devices only detected an electrical fault or overload, and lacked a way to report additional protection information. With the advent of microprocessor based relays, more advanced protection schemes, that correctly identify faults in acceptable timeframes, have been developed. Communication schemes for providing electrical protection have also evolved with microprocessor based relays [5] . SCADA communications protocols and standards have been developed for the purpose of collecting information from remote process locations for use in central processing calculations. This paper proposes the use of the IEC 61850 standard to serve as the backbone for communications for addressing the IED-interface issue. The IEC 61850 standard can also be used for controlling main-tie-main schemes through communications rather than hardwire, in addition to its added SCADA benefits [6] .
IV. IEC 61850-STANDARDOVERVIEW
IEC 61850 is an international standard titled "Communication Networks and Systems in Substations," developed by Technical Committee 57. The standard focuses on substation automation [7] , and was drafted and adopted in an effort to unify substation equipment and communications on a common platform, regardless of manufacturer. IEC 61850 is divided into ten sub-sections that range from defming protocol terminology to conformance testing [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . "The Uni ted States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has advised the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that it has identified IEC 61850 as one of five 'foundational' standards for smart grid interoperability and cyber security. This clearly shows that IEC 61850 is foreseeable in the future of all protection, automation, and control systems throughout the world [23] ."
There are multiple benefits to the IEC 61850 standard, which include: support of comprehensive substation functions; ease of design, specification, setup, and maintenance; strong functional support for substation communication; and flexibility to support system evolution [24] . AdditionaIly, the standard was structured to accommodate current technology [25] .
IEC 61850 was designed to use object-oriented data structures and protocols.
As such, data parameters are defmed as objects, and each object has multiple attributes, very similar to that of high level programming languages. Each intelligent electronic device (IED) is accessed by a network address.
The physical devices, in the case of taconite mining, e.g., relays, meters, and switchgear, are represented by a logical device that contains all relevant, non distributed, logical nodes (i.e., functions in the real device such as metering, protection, and physical position). Each logical node contains data and data attributes that describe operations, positions, and other relevant characteristics of the IED. These values are exchanged according to defined rules and communication mechanisms [13] .
The way this information is shared across the network is defined by communications and mapping portions of the IEC 61850 standard.
With the development of the IEC 61850 standard, three main forms of communications are defined: GOOSE, MMS, and SMV [20, 21] . This paper focuses on MMS and how taconite facilities can interface the electrical distribution to current process SCADA and control systems.
The Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) is generally preferred for SCADA or non-time-critical data acquisition. MMS is defined by ISO standard 9506 and is widely used in control networks. MMS defines the structure for communication messages transferred between controllers as weIl as between engineering stations and controllers. Each IEC 61850 object is mapped to a corresponding MMS object, and each IEC 61850 service is also mapped to a corresponding MMS operation [25] .
The application described in this paper uses MMS to trans mit report information from IEDs to an automation controller. A visualization of the IEC 61850 standard can be seen in Fig. 6 . This figure shows the physical device, i.e., the IED, broken down into various logical nodes where various measurands are housed for distribution throughout the SCADA system. Fig. 6 represents the physical media connection to the Ethernet based network. The media chosen for taconite mining applications is either copper or fiber depending on whether or not there is an electromagnetic interference (EMI) concern. The physical device is then connected to this network. In this example, a feeder relay will be discussed. The IEC 61850 model then defines the Logical Device, which in this case will be the logical microprocessor pieces that make the physical device behave as a feeder protective device. The next level of the object oriented model is the logical node.
The black line in
The logical node encapsulates information that the IED can provide into groups such as measurands, protection, circuit breaker, etc. Contained in each logical node are data objects as weil as physical data. In Fig. 6 , there are two data objects labeled XCBR, which refers to the operation of a circuit breaker, and MMXU, which refers to metering. The XCBR data object contains information such as a status value (StV) and a quality health flag (q). The MMXU or measurand data object in this example is looking at phase current. In this example, phase A and phase B currents are depicted, but additional information such as the metered timestamp and quality flag are also defined.
As mentioned, there is a mechanism used for high speed peer-to-peer communications, defmed as the Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE). The GOOSE protocol provides a means for an IED to send unsolicited messages over a communications network that can be received by a single or multiple IEDs in a peer-to-peer or one-to-many fashion [16, 24] . It is used for fast, reliable transmission of substation events such as alarms, commands, and indicators. In general, GOOSE is used for high speed, high priority applications, such as protection interlocking and time-critical events where information needs to be delivered directly between IEDs. For example, in Fig. 5 , if a load needs to be quickly switched between buses Al and A2, GOOSE messaging would be used between the relays and the transfer switches to configure the electric distribution system for the fast motor bus transfer.
For SCADA applications that utilize MMS, reports are used to transfer data from the IED to the collection point. Reports are unsolicited methods of sending datasets from an IED. The standard defines two types: buffered and unbuffered. When using buffered reports, the IED keeps track of client message receipt so that any missed reports can be re sent if there is a network problem. Unbuffered reports will not fill in the gap if the link is lost. The MMS protocol can also provide datasets via direct polling by the client. This method provides no buffering and eliminates deadbands on analog measurements. Each report can contain information including measurands, targets, and system health.
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V.
SOLUTION OVERVIEW
This section discusses an IEC 61850 solution applied to a simplified application that would be representative of a taconite facility. The distribution and SCADA system is broken down to its base components, and their functionality is described.
The basic architecture consists of three major components: IEDs, programmable automation controllers, and IEC 61850 to EtherNet/IP gateway modules. These components are all interconnected via the network infrastructure, in this case, copper based Ethernet. Fig. 7 depicts a simplified visualization of a typical system architecture configuration. The IEDs represented in Fig. 7 are a typical 50/51 Time Delay Overcurrent (TDOC) protection relay along with a full featured motor/feeder protection relay. These relays would be placed on the feeders and near the transfer switches to where the rotating machinery connects to the feeder buses in the facility. These devices are usually installed to protect critical rotating machines. For taconite mining, these devices are protecting coarse and fine crushers, as weil as ball mill motors.
These relays are configured for IEC 61850 via the IEEE 802.3 port.
Buffered reports are defined to supply information to the control system at a given rate, the most common being a one-second interval. This interval period can be changed to accommodate various applications and process needs. For example, in taconite mining, the real power flows may be of interest to ensure that loads do not 5 exceed the amount of spinning reserve that can be supplied from the electrical source. Because real power does not change at a fast rate, this measurand, as weil as others, can be grouped in ar eport and sent each minute if desired. Additionally, any form of relay can be used with this setup, as long as it is IEC 61850 compliant. For example, in a taconite mine, many differential protection relays are used to protect the larger transformers that feed the processes within a facility. In addition, if a facility is large enough, there may be an opportunity for co-generation where generator protection relays would be installed.
B.
IEC 61850 to EtherNetliP Gateway
The gateway module provides the functionality of this solution by Iinking the electric distribution system to the process SCADA and control system. By mapping IEC 61850 tags to controller tags, information can be transferred from protection systems to control systems. The gateway module functions on a tag database environment as described in section VI. When the integrity or poIl period is exceeded, or an event by exception is generated, ar eport is received by the gateway, the information is parsed, and an internal data table is updated.
This information is then pushed to the programmable automation controller according to common industrial protocol (CIP) guidelines.
The gateway module is equipped with the ability to define remote bits to address the command and control aspects, discussed further in section VII. In order for the controller to understand the data structure of information being sent over the wire, the gateway module also defmes an Add-On Instruction (AOI) that defmes the data type for each IED in the associated network. This Add-On instruction uses the IEC 61850 mapping to determine the byte layout of the data as it moves from the gateway to the automation controller. The Add-On instruction parses the data stream into corresponding EtherNet/IP tags so that they can be entered in the controller data table.
C.
Programmable Automation Controller
When the AOI is imported into software logic, the programmable automation controller interprets the information sent from the gateway module into its internal tag database. Because a comprehensive level of electrical distribution and protection data are now available at the controller level, many new benefits become available [25] .
From an operator's perspective, one now has the ability to monitor, plant-wide, all electrical processes.
For the application described in this paper, benefits include individual machine monitoring and control for coarse and fine crushers in addition to rod and ball mills. Additionally, operations personnel can now view information from any operator workstation within the facility or on the enterprise network. Because the information is contained within the controller, this solution allows for the alarming of any 6 measurand. Subsequently, the control system can also be permitted to take remedial action based upon these alarms [26] .
D.
Network lnfrastructure
From a network perspective, this solution requires the use of a network switch to interconnect all devices. This switch should be a managed type to preserve data quality of service throughout the network and provide layers of security. A managed switch should be utilized for segmentation of the network as weil as an additional level of system security. By utilizing the virtual local area network (VLAN) feature of managed switches, groups of IEDs can be logically separated from other process equipment such as drives and motor control centers.
VI. THE GATEWAY SOLUTION
The hardware solution that was developed for this application is a standalone hardware gateway. This section describes how the gateway bridges the IEC 61850 and process control network. The gateway module consists of a main processor with various peripherals including a network lO/100 Mbit/s copper interface and Secure Disk (SD) interface to store system configurations.
The process of collecting data from various IEDs and converting it to an industry accepted process control protocol is performed through the concept of multi-threading. Fig. 8 depicts the various threads that are executing at any given time during the operation of the hardware gateway. The processor contains the master control program (MCP). This program is a watchdog timer running on a Linux based operating system that evaluates the time to execute each thread that is running. If a thread should get stuck or exceed five milliseconds to execute, the MCP will terminate and re instantiate the thread. A graphical user interface was developed in the Windows environment that provides the user drag-and-drop capabilities to define parameters that are to be sent to the automation controller. When the module is configured from the user interface software, report configurations containing IED parameters are stored on the gateway module SD card. Additionally, when the user maps the IEC 61850 tags to EtherNet/IP tags, each 61850 tag is allocated a certain number of bytes depending upon the data type: Boolean, float, double integer, etc. This configuration is also defined on the SD card. Tables l and 11 show an example of how measurands and protection parameters would be mapped utilizing this solution. Table I illustrates various parameters that would be of interest to a process engineer in a taconite facility. These parameters include fundamental measurands, thermals, physical status, and protection information. Table 11 graphically defines how these data objects are packaged for delivery to an automation controller with a 32 bit processor. 
As previously mentioned, when the user maps IEC 61850 tags to EtherNet/IP tags, a certain number of bytes are allocated to each parameter or tag. The data are transferred from the gateway to the automation controller via a class 1 Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) message. CIP messages are lirnited to 500 bytes of input data, 496 bytes of output data, and a configuration header. The information in the tag database is grouped into chunks of 500 byte packets or data table reads. A parallel thread is created for every group of 500 bytes that needs to be sent to the controller. This thread is constructed using the Open Device Vendors Association (ODV A) stack for EtherNet/IP. This organization manages the configuration of the drivers for the CIP protocols.
The tag database thread can be thought of as a large array of data. The array begins at index zero and ends with the index of the last byte of data that needs to be transferred. This thread is the key to the operational success of the gateway module. The tag database is populated by the IEC 61850 thread, and information is read from the tag database by the EtherNet/IP thread to be sent to the process control system. When the 61850 thread writes to the tag database, it writes to an index offset from the base, i.e., the beginning
2013-MIC-405
location of where the parameter or electrical measurand lies within the array of data to be captured. At the same time, the data that have changed also set a semaphore, or Boolean tlag, indicating new data is to be read by the EtherNet/IP driver. The same process is performed when the parameter is to be read by the EtherNet/IP driver and published to the controller. The process can be seen in Fig. 9 . 
VII.

BENEFITS OF SOLUTION
EtherNet/IP �.1"
Write Command
This section discusses the merits of implementing the previously described system in a mining application. Topics discussed in this section will be visualization, sequence of events, system health, safety, and load management.
A. Visualization
Although automation control companies have developed solutions for process visualization, this solution takes process visualization one step further into the electrical distribution system. The lEe 61850 protocol allows for the visual representation of reports and alarms at the process control level. With the development of more sophisticated Hwnan Machine Interface (HMI) screens, global objects have been introduced into the automation graphics. The use of these global objects has allowed for the creation of faceplates [25] .
Faceplates are defined as reusable standard objects. Examples of process faceplates can be seen in Figs. 10 and 11. Fig. 10 shows the representation of the relay with its command and control functions. Fig. 11 shows one of the screens with measurand information. The example shown in Figs. 10 and 11 depict feeder and motor protection relay faceplates.
These graphics provide the most common information collected from mining applications as many assets are rotating machinery and bus bar protection. Fig. 10 depicts the main screen of a feeder protection relay faceplate. Each faceplate was constructed with multiple tabs to change between horne, engineering, and diagnostic screens. Graphics were designed in order to provide a user experience similar to interacting with the physical device. For example the backwards pointing arrow represents target reset, the lock icon represents the lock and unlock function of the IED. Status indications are given in the alarms and events text window providing the operator a visual representation of the IED's state. The engineering tab, as depicted in Fig. 11,   7 displays fundamental metering data for the device. The advantage of the faceplate is that it is a familiar, standard, prebuilt, object that can be implemented repeatedly for similar engineering designs. Each faceplate has 20 security levels built into the objects themselves. These security features can be customized based upon user and application. A prime example of the security benefit would be command and control of IEDs to start and stop a crusher or the actuation of a circuit breaker.
The command and control portion of this solution allows operators and engineers to change setting groups and also allows relay actuation from a remote location. It is extremely important to note that even though the standard defines how an IED communicates on an IEC 61850 network, it does not include configuration information for the protection and control functions in a relay. Furthermore, the IEC 61850 standard does not provide a unified method for designing communication-assisted automation, e.g., command and control functionality. The development and subsequent use of faceplates is a solution that addresses both of these concerns. This solution offers the operations personnel a standard methodology not only to gather the information from the system, but also to control it.
B.
Sequence of Events
Sequence of Events for electric distribution systems is defined by IEEE standard C3 7.1. IEC 61850 allows for the time stamping of target events at the relay level with 64 bit double integer precision. This represents sub-millisecond accuracy [26] . In addition, as many IEDs are commonly connected to an absolute reference such as a GPS time clock, the time stamp associated with each event is therefore accurate to GPS time quality [25] .
Reports can be constructed to transfer this timestamp back to control systems to be logged and displayed on workstations. With the migration of GPS time to the controller level, these timestamps can now be compared, plant-wide with electrical, mechanical, and process systems. For example, timestamps would be useful in reconstructing the sequence of events that lead to process facility downtime.
C.
System Health IEC 61850 defines a quality flag in each logical node that can help validate the quality of the measurement received from the IED at the SCADA system. This quality indicator is usually a Boolean or integer value that will indicate a finite state of a device, e.g., faulted. The quality flag can also be used to assess the quality of the measurands. Additionally, the time stamp associated with measurands and trip or alarm events is also evaluated by a quality flag which indicates timestamp accuracy relative to universal time coordinated (UTC) or other time reference [25] . The system health quality flag in conjunction with long term trending can help improve predictive maintenance models at mines.
D. Safety
When metering or protective relays are mounted directly on the front of switchgear or motor control cabinets, certain safety concerns arise. Operating personnel who are asked to interact with the devices on the doors of this type of equipment may be exposed to arc flash hazards, especially during setting changes to the devices that can cause the actuation of a circuit breaker, contactor, or other secondary control device. As a result, monitoring and re-programming the relay remotely keeps personnel far from any potentially hazardous environment or situation [6, 25] .
There may be a desire to place the relaying and metering in a separate control area away from the switchgear. This is contingent upon factors including: available space, current transformer burden capabilities, as weil as hardwiring back to the control and switchgear. Although this method isolates the individual from the arc hazard, it introduces additional costs, additional space requirements, and additional wiring on critical connections. As such, this method may not be viewed as optimal.
By using relaying and metering products that include the IEC 61850 standard over a common Ethernet communication media, one can connect remotely to any metering or protective device with complete isolation from all electrical hazards. The entire process can be controlled and monitored visually without being near the relays, metering devices, or the actual electrical equipment being controlled and monitored, thus completely eliminating the arc-hazard to personnel [25] .
E. Demand Side Management
Energy management is becoming increasingly important for managing the increasing demand for electricity. Generally, energy management is composed of two components -improving efficiency and managing demand. Demand management is generally achieved by shedding loads during periods of high demand to prevent system overloads.
A common form of demand management is the use of an interruptible rate agreement in which the utility can shed loads in return for a special rate. Interruptible rates are very beneficial to utilities because it allows them to manage periods of high demand relatively easily. And, although the interruptible rate agreement can lead to savings through reduced rates, it is generally not a practical option for mining companies because it is impractical to take critical loads (or entire facilities) off-Iine on short notice. A more practical approach for the mining industry is to implement some form of load leveling during periods of high demand with the goal of reducing the demand component of its utility bill. This approach gives mining companies the ability to reduce electricity costs and control how it is done.
Load leveling can be achieved in many different ways. For example, loads can be shed automatically when the consumption rate exceeds a predefmed rate called the ideal rate. Loads with the lowest priority are shed first, followed by loads with the second lowest priority, and so forth. Other demand control strategies can include demand prediction such that loads are shed when the predicted energy consumption in the current demand interval exceeds a specified value.
One of the difficulties of implementing load-side demand management has been the cost of installing monitoring and
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control equipment. By linking the protection and mete ring devices that include the IEC 61850 standard to the site-wide control system, mining companies can more easily implement load-side demand management at a relatively small cost.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The IEC 61850 standard provides a uniform method of communication among multivendor intelligent electronic devices used for system monitoring, control, and protection. Connecting these devices to the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system through the gateway, as described in this paper, can greatly enhance system command and control functionality.
Benefits to the mining industry include improved system monitoring, improved safety through remote control of power system components, reduction in downtime through the reconstruction of the sequence of events leading to system failures, and the implementation of demand management.
